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*  The Honorable Clarkson S. Fisher, Senior United States 
District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by 
designation. 
  
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Michael Murray was convicted following a jury 
trial of an intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing 
criminal enterprise ("CCE") in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
848(e)(1)(A); conspiracy to distribute in excess of five 
kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 
841(a)(1); and distribution of and possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  In 
this appeal, Murray argues that the district court erred in (1) 
admitting testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 that he 
had committed a murder not charged in the indictment; (2) 
admitting under Fed. R. Evid. 608 evidence supporting the 
credibility of the only testifying eyewitness to the events 
immediately preceding the charged murder; (3) denying Murray’s 
motion to excuse for cause a juror who had read a newspaper 
article about the case; and (4) denying Murray’s motion to 
suppress the testimony of a jailhouse informant.  We hold that 
the district court erred under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 in 
admitting testimony about the uncharged murder and in admitting 
evidence about specific instances of conduct supporting the 
credibility of the eyewitness, in contravention of Fed. R. Evid. 
608(b).  We conclude that these errors require reversal of 
Murray’s murder conviction but that they are harmless with 
respect to his convictions on the other charges.     
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 I. 
 Murray was indicted and arrested in August 1992.  (App. 
13) The superseding indictment on which he was tried alleged that 
Murray (whose "street name" was "Solo") and co-defendants 
Jonathan Ray Bradley ("Fresh" or "Johnny Fresh") and Emanuel 
Harrison ("Paradise") intentionally killed Juan Carlos Bacallo on 
January 28, 1992, while engaging in and working in furtherance of 
a drug distribution CCE. (App. 64) Bradley was alleged to be the 
leader of the drug ring, which imported cocaine from New York 
City in cookie boxes for sale in the 1400-1600 block of Market 
Street in Harrisburg. (App. 65-66)  
 In August 1993, the government filed notice that it 
would seek the death penalty against Murray. (App. 73-75) See 
United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271 (M.D. Pa. 1994) 
(addressing death penalty issues).  In June 1994, on the last day 
scheduled for jury selection, the parties informed the court that 
they had reached a plea agreement, and two days later, Murray, 
Bradley, and Harrison entered guilty pleas.  (App. 88, 107-11) 
Murray’s plea agreement was designed to result in an offense 
level of 40 (a base offense level of 43 with a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility), which would have 
produced a sentence in the neighborhood of 25 years’ 
imprisonment, and the agreement provided that he could withdraw 
the plea if for any reason his offense level was ultimately 
calculated to be higher than 40.  (App. 108).  Because the 
  
 
 4 
district court judge did not believe that Murray was entitled to 
a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due to his failure 
to show remorse, she held that Murray’s offense level would be 
43, which would have required a life sentence.  (App. 50) Murray 
then moved to withdraw his plea, and the court granted the 
motion. (App. 52) Murray sought reconsideration of the death 
penalty authorization, and a few days before jury selection was 
scheduled to begin, the government advised that the Attorney 
General had withdrawn that authorization. (App. 337).  Before 
this time, the government had been planning to use testimony 
concerning the uncharged murder during the sentencing phase as 
part of its argument in favor of the death penalty, but after the 
death penalty authorization was withdrawn, the government decided 
to attempt to introduce this testimony during the guilt phase of 
Murray’s trial.  See Govt. Br. at 33 n.2.  (App. 78, 85). 
 Murray's trial lasted four days.  The government 
offered strong evidence concerning his drug distribution 
activities, and we will not recount that evidence here.  However, 
because of its relationship to Murray's two key evidentiary 
arguments, we will summarize the evidence relating to the murder. 
The government presented evidence that Bacallo, the murder 
victim, had been working for Bradley’s drug ring as a street-
level dealer and that he owed Bradley money for drugs he had been 
"fronted."  (App. 786).  Marguerite King, Bacallo’s girlfriend, 
testified that a week before he was murdered Bacallo approached 
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Bradley to inform him that he was quitting the drug business and 
that Bradley responded by pointing a sawed-off shotgun at 
Bacallo’s head and telling him that "once you are in this 
business, you never get out."  (App. 787, 791) King admitted that 
she had lied to the police when she was questioned shortly after 
the murder, explaining that she had been afraid to tell the truth 
because Harrison was with her.  (App. 788-89)   
 Jay Williams testified that on the night of the murder, 
Bacallo, Harrison, and he went to a bar even though Bacallo did 
not want to go. (App. 803-04)  Williams said that he and Harrison 
asked Bacallo if the reason he did not want to go the bar was 
because "you don’t got Fresh’s money," but Bacallo denied this.  
(App. 803-04) Williams testified that inside the bar Bradley and 
Murray "smack[ed]" Bacallo repeatedly and that Bacallo, Bradley, 
Murray, and Harrison left the bar and got into a taxicab because, 
as Bacallo said, "[t]hey want me to do something for them."  
(App. 805-06) Williams admitted that at the time he testified he 
was incarcerated for drug trafficking, that he had lied shortly 
after the murder when he gave the police a statement (in which he 
denied any knowledge of the anything relating to the murder), and 
that he had been smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol on the 
night of the murder.  (App. 799, 807, 811-12)    
 Richard Brown, a taxicab driver who was "friends" with 
Murray, testified that he picked up Bacallo, Murray, and Harrison 
(but not Bradley) in his cab on January 28, 1992, and that, at 
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Murray's direction, he drove them to a deserted part of State 
Farm Road in Susquehanna Township.  (App. 717-19) He gave the 
following account of what happened next.  Murray told Brown to 
pull over and instructed Bacallo to get out of the car because 
"he was going to make him walk."  (App. 719) Harrison, whom Brown 
had noticed was carrying a sawed-off shotgun beneath his coat, 
remained in the car.  (App. 719) Shortly after Murray and Bacallo 
walked away from the car, Brown heard gunshots.  (App. 720) A few 
seconds later, Murray got back into the car, carrying a .45 
caliber pistol, and said something to the effect of "that is what 
someone gets for being in violation."  (App. 720) "[S]cared as 
hell," Brown drove Murray and Harrison back into town and then 
returned home.  (App. 721-22) When he got home, Brown told 
Stephanie Stewart, with whom he was living at the time, what had 
happened.  (App. 722)  
 Brown admitted that he had been working as an informant 
for the Harrisburg Police Department at the time of the murder, 
but that he had not reported what he had seen in the early 
morning of January 28, 1992, until July or August of that year.  
(App. 723) Brown explained that he waited so long "[b]ecause 
quite frankly, I was afraid, not only for myself, but for the 
people I cared about the [sic].  My mother was dying of cancer.  
I didn’t want any accidents to happen to any of them.  I cared 
about my children."  (App. 723) Brown admitted that he had been 
using marijuana and cocaine for 27 years and that he had been 
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convicted of cocaine possession and theft of services.  (App. 
725)   
 Stewart testified that when Brown returned home the day 
of the murder he told her that "I just saw Solo kill someone."  
(App. 767-68) She stated that when she read about the murder in 
the newspaper she asked Brown, "Is this what you were talking 
about?" and that he replied in the affirmative.  (App. 776) 
 After Murray cross-examined Brown, the government 
called Lt. John Goshert, a Harrisburg police officer, to testify 
in support of Brown’s reliability.  Murray objected to Goshert’s 
testimony on the ground that "the character of [Brown] for 
truthfulness" had not been "attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise," Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), and that even if it 
had, Lt. Goshert’s testimony violated Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)’s 
proscription on proof of specific instances of conduct by 
extrinsic evidence.  (App. 822, 826-29) The court overruled 
Murray’s objection.  (App. 829)   
 Lt. Goshert testified that, as the officer in charge of 
the Harrisburg police drug enforcement unit, he had utilized 
Brown as a confidential informant since 1988.  (App. 834-36) Lt. 
Goshert stated that in his opinion Brown was "extremely reliable" 
in providing accurate information.  (App. 836) Lt. Goshert 
explained that the Harrisburg police had "made" "[i]n excess of 
65" cases and had obtained "numerous" search warrants as a result 
of Brown’s services as an informant.  (App. 836) 
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 Robert McCallister, a Susquehanna police officer, 
testified that he discovered Bacallo’s body on the morning of 
January 28, 1992, and found seven shell casings nearby.  (App. 
648, 651-52)  James Rottmund, a ballistics expert, testified that 
all seven casings were from the same .45 caliber gun and that the 
shots were fired from a distance of at least five feet.  (App. 
683-84) Dr. Isadore Mihalakis, a medical examiner, testified that 
Bacallo had suffered eight gunshot wounds: one to the right 
thigh, three to the right buttock, two to one hand, one to the 
other wrist, and one to the head.  (App. 702-05, 707) Dr. 
Mihalakis testified that all eight wounds (which, he said, might 
have been caused by seven shots) were inflicted from behind, that 
the shot to the head was the final one, and that it occurred with 
Bacallo in a prone position.  (App. 705, 710) He concluded that 
the manner of death was homicide.  (App. 713) 
 Randy Drawbaugh and Sean Proffit, both jailhouse 
informants, testified as well.  Drawbaugh testified that Murray 
had told him that "he shot a guy named Carlos" because "Carlos" 
owed him money.  (App. 851-52) Proffit testified that Murray told 
him that he was going to "get" all of the witnesses against him 
when he was released from jail and, in particular, that "there 
was a certain witness named Juice [Xenophon Singleton] that he 
was going to get and throw his baby off the roof of a building." 
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 (App. 870) Drawbaugh and Proffit were impeached with their 
criminal records.1 
 Murray’s Rule 404(b) and 403 arguments are based on the 
testimony of Jemeke Stukes ("Quest").  Stukes testified that, 
while in New York City, he met Bradley, who introduced him to 
Murray.  In August 1991, Stukes said, he went to Harrisburg to 
sell cocaine at Bradley’s invitation. (App. 463-64) Stukes was 
indicted and arrested at the same time as Murray and pled guilty 
in January 1993 to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, for which he 
was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment.  (App. 19, 449)   At 
the time of Murray’s trial, Stukes had recently completed a 
combined 38 months of imprisonment on the federal conviction and 
related state charges.  (App. 446-50)  Stukes testified that 
Murray committed an uncharged murder in New York City in 1991.  
According to Stukes, in the middle of August 1991, "[a] guy by 
the name of Howie came by Mr. Bradley’s store in Manhattan and 
said his little cousin was having problems with this guy," 
referring to a dispute over drug territory.  (App. 457) Bradley 
told Howie that "me and Solo will take care of it," and he asked 
Stukes to "go along."  (App. 457) Stukes explained that "Fresh 
[Bradley] had me go along to see how his reputation is 
established because, you know, he has a rep in New York as being 
                     
11.  Prior to trial, Murray had moved to exclude Proffit’s 
testimony on the ground that Proffit’s conversation with him 
violated Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), but after 
a pretrial hearing, the court denied the motion. (App. 412) 
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a shooter, and, you know, a fairly large drug dealer."  (App. 
458) On a Sunday afternoon, "Howie" drove Bradley, Murray, and 
Stukes in a van to a housing project at 169th Street and 
Washington Avenue in the Bronx to look for a "heavy-set" 
Panamanian man. (App. 459) Stukes testified that Bradley and 
Murray wrapped their faces in towels so that only their eyes were 
visible and that all three of them left the van while Howie 
remained in it.  (App. 459) Then, according to Stukes, "Solo 
[Murray] went up to the guy" while "Fresh [Bradley] stood across 
the street."  (App. 459) Stukes testified that "Solo went up to 
the guy and pumped four slugs in his chest.  And as he was 
running back towards the van, Fresh, you know, had his gun out 
and he sprayed the building, you know, fired shots at the 
building because there was people standing out there."  (App. 
460) Stukes fled the scene in a taxicab and did not report the 
incident to the police.  (App. 461, 463) Shortly thereafter, 
Stukes went to Harrisburg with Bradley and Murray.   
 A New York City Housing Police report shows that a man 
named Jorge Tesis was shot and killed on Sunday, July 21, 1991, 
at the location indicated by Stukes.  (App. 328) Two other 
individuals were also shot but were not seriously injured.  (App. 
328) The report describes the alleged perpetrator as a 5'8" tall 
20-year old; Murray was 18 or 19 years old at the time and is 6' 
tall.  (App. 328, 822) According to the report, a "witness states 
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male walked up to [the victim] and opened fire with a gun 
striking victim in the stomach and chest."  (App. 329)    
 Murray was convicted on all counts.  (App. 57) A 
sentence of life imprisonment was imposed, and Murray appealed.   
 
 II. 
         Murray challenges the admission of Stukes’ testimony 
under both Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 403.  We 
address his Rule 404(b) argument first.   
 A.  As a general rule, "all relevant evidence is 
admissible," Fed. R. Evid. 402, and evidence is "relevant" if its 
existence simply has some "tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  Fed. R. Evid. 401.  However, Rule 404(b)  
restricts the admission of one category of relevant evidence. 
Rule 404(b) provides in part as follows: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of the person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
 
Thus, in order for "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" 
to be admissible, it must be relevant to prove something other 
than "the character of the person in order to show that he acted 
in conformity therewith."  In this case, therefore, Rule 404(b) 
  
 
 12 
barred Stukes' testimony if it was relevant only to permit the 
jury to infer that Murray had a homicidal character and that this 
character found expression in the murder of Bacallo.  But if 
Stukes' testimony was relevant to prove anything else, Rule 
404(b) did not preclude its admission.  On appeal, Rule 404(b) 
rulings "may be reversed only when they are clearly contrary to 
reason and not justified by the evidence."  United States v. 
Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 1996)(quotation omitted).  See 
also United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 
1994).  
  The admission of evidence that is allowed by Rule 
404(b) is not disfavored, but trial judges need to exercise 
particular care in admitting such evidence.  This is so for at 
least two reasons.  First, the line between what is permitted and 
what is prohibited under Rule 404(b) is sometimes quite subtle.  
Second, Rule 404(b) evidence sometimes carries a substantial 
danger of unfair prejudice and thus raises serious questions 
under Fed. R. Evid. 403.  Therefore, it is advisable for a trial 
judge to insist that a party offering Rule 404(b) evidence place 
on the record a clear explanation of the chain of inferences 
leading from the evidence in question to a fact "that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action."  Fed. R. Evid 
401.   And it is likewise advisable for the trial court to place 
on the record a clear explanation of the basis for its ruling on 
the admission of the evidence.  Not only do these procedures help 
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to ensure that sensitive Rule 404(b) rulings are made with care 
(and thus to diminish the likelihood that these rulings will 
result in reversals), but these procedures greatly assist the 
process of appellate review.  Consequently, although the language 
of Rule 404(b) does not require such procedures, our cases have 
emphasized their usefulness.  See Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 782; 
United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Unfortunately, these procedures were not followed here. 
 The government never provided a clear explanation on the record 
of the chain of inferences on which it was relying.2  Its best 
explanation appears to have occurred at the charge conference, 
                     
2.  The government contends that Murray never objected under Rule 
404(b) or Rule 403 to the introduction of Stukes’ testimony.  
However, it appears to us that Murray did raise both of these 
issues.  The court opened the August 10, 1995 hearing by making 
its Rule 403 ruling (App. 377), which indicates that Murray had 
argued this point in chambers.  In addition, Murray repeated the 
objection on the record, if somewhat obliquely.  See App. 382 
("Your Honor, I would also point out that as the Court has noted, 
it is highly prejudicial.") Shortly thereafter, the government 
referred to the court’s off-the-record discussion of the Rule 403 
issue.  (App. 385) At an August 14 hearing, Murray’s counsel 
noted that "[m]ost of my argument on the 404(b) material, the New 
York murders, was said in chambers off the record."  (App. 818) 
Later, when the court asked Murray’s counsel to draft a limiting 
instruction for Stukes’ testimony, he replied that "I am not 
quite sure what the relevance was, and it was my contention that 
it was not relevant."  (App. 820) While it is true that much of 
Murray’s ire with respect to Stukes’ testimony was directed at 
the fact that he did not receive notice that it would be used in 
the government’s case-in-chief until the day before trial 
(because of the government’s last-minute change in strategy 
precipitated by the withdrawal of the death penalty 
authorization), we are satisfied that Murray made it sufficiently 
clear that he was objecting to its relevance under Rule 404(b) 
and to its unfair prejudicial effect under Rule 403.  Fed. R. 
Evid. 103(a).  Cf. United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).   
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when the prosecutor stated that Stukes’ testimony "wasn’t just 
[offered for] identity.  Role in the organization, common scheme, 
plan, a number of different reasons."  (App. 957)  The 
prosecution provided no further explanation beyond these 
conclusory statements, and the district court similarly gave 
little explanation for its ruling admitting this highly sensitive 
evidence.  The district court's most complete on-the-record 
explanation appears to have occurred during the charge to the 
jury when it said only that the evidence was admitted "for the 
very limited purpose to show identity, role in the conspiracy, a 
common scheme or plan," and cautioned that it was not admissible 
to prove character.  (App. 995-96) We have searched the record 
but have been unable to find anything other than these conclusory 
assertions to support the admission of Stukes’ testimony 
regarding the uncharged New York murder.   
 We have examined each of the grounds offered by the 
prosecution and accepted by the trial judge for the admission of 
this testimony, and even under the highly deferential standard of 
review that we generally apply to a trial judge's Rule 404(b) 
rulings, we believe that the admission of this evidence was 
improper.  The government’s principal Rule 404(b) argument seems 
to be that Stukes’ testimony was relevant to show Murray’s role 
in the conspiracy.  While the government's brief does little to 
flesh out this argument, we perceive the argument to run as 
follows:  Murray murdered the victim in New York City at the 
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behest of the CCE charged in the indictment; from this fact, the 
jury could infer that Murray was the CCE's designated "shooter"; 
and from this fact, the jury could infer that the shooting of 
Bacallo, which was committed in the interests of the Bradley CCE, 
was performed by Murray.    
 This theory, however, is undermined by the absence of 
any evidence that the New York murder about which Stukes 
testified was in any way related to the charged CCE.  On the 
contrary, it appears from Stukes’ testimony that the murder arose 
out of a dispute between the cousin of a friend of Bradley’s 
("Howie") and the New York victim over drug sales in New York 
City.  The government has not directed our attention to any 
evidence that Howie, his cousin, or the New York victim were 
involved in the CCE described in the indictment or that the 
dispute with the New York victim had anything to do with the 
activities of that CCE, whose drug sales took place in 
Harrisburg.  (App. 65-66) Thus, evidence that Murray was a 
triggerman in the New York murder does not tend to show that he 
performed the same role in the Harrisburg CCE, and consequently 
this evidence does not seem to be admissible under Rule 404(b) to 
show his role in the charged CCE.3 
                     
3.  The government might conceivably have argued, not that the 
New York murder showed that Murray played the role of the CCE's  
designated killer, but that he played the role of Bradley's 
personal killer.  But even if the government had made this 
argument, the legitimate probative value of this evidence would 
have been substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice for essentially the reasons set out in part IIB of this 
opinion. 
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 The absence of evidence that the New York murder was 
related to the CCE charged in the indictment also dooms the 
government's argument that evidence of the New York murder was 
admissible because it and Bacallo’s murder were committed on the 
basis of a common plan or scheme.  As we explained in Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 916 (3d Cir. 
1992), "[o]rdinarily, when courts speak of ‘common plan or 
scheme,’ they are referring to a situation in which the charged 
and the uncharged crimes are parts of a single series of events." 
 In this case, there is no evidence that the two killings were 
planned together or that they involved a common design.  Cf. 
United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(admitting evidence that the defendant police officer had 
previously employed a "remarkably similar" extortion scheme in 
which "a motorist is stopped for speeding, a firearm is 
discovered, and the motorist is given the choice of facing 
charges or ‘working it out’ with Baker").4   
                     
4.  The same is true with respect to the government's suggestion 
on appeal that evidence of the New York murder was admissible to 
establish the existence of the charged CCE and Murray's 
membership in it.  See Govt. Br. at 29.  Since there was no 
evidence that the New York murder was committed as part of the 
charged CCE, Murray's commission of that murder does not tend to 
show either the existence of that enterprise or Murray's 
membership. 
 
    Another related argument advanced by the government on appeal 
is the contention that the New York murder showed Murray's motive 
for the Bacallo murder, "that is to advance the interests of the 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise."  Govt. Br. at 35.  Apparently, 
the government's theory is that the New York murder was relevant 
to show Murray's membership in the CCE and thus to show that he 
had a motive for the Bacallo killing, which furthered the CCE's 
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  We also see no merit in the government's argument in 
the district court that proof of the New York murder was 
admissible to prove "identity" because that murder was "a 
signature killing" and because Bacallo’s murder bore the same 
signature. (App. 820)  "The evidence concerning the manner in 
which the two alleged crimes were committed here was neither 
sufficiently detailed nor significantly unusual to permit any 
inference that the perpetrator of the second [crime] was the same 
perpetrator of the first."  Pinney, 967 F.2d at 916.  The New 
York murder was committed during the day on a public street at 
the spot where the victim was found.  The shooting occurred in 
the presence of bystanders, some of whom were apparently hit.  
Two gunmen participated.  By contrast, the Harrisburg murder 
occurred at night in a secluded spot to which the victim was 
taken.  There were no innocent bystanders, and it appears that 
only one gun was used.5 
(..continued) 
interests.  But the lack of evidence linking the New York murder 
to the CCE is fatal to this theory.    
5.  On appeal, the government advances the apparently new 
argument that evidence of the New York murder was admissible to 
refute in advance a claim that Murray had made in a letter to the 
district court after the sentencing hearing that followed his 
abortive guilty plea.  At that time, Murray claimed that Bacallo 
had lunged at him prior to the shooting, and the government 
maintains that evidence of the New York murder was relevant to 
show that the Bacallo killing was not accidental and was not 
committed in self-defense.  Govt. Br. at 29-30.  The government 
further argues that it "did not have to wait for rebuttal to 
offer this evidence."  Id. at 30.  Murray, however, did not 
testify, and the government does not claim that the defense ever 
suggested to the jury that the Bacallo murder was accidental or 
that it occurred in self-defense.  Moreover, the government 
itself notes that the theory that the killing was accidental or 
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 In sum, we do not believe that any of the grounds 
advanced by the prosecution and accepted by the district court at 
trial can justify the admission of the evidence of the New York 
murder under Rule 404(b).  
 B.  Moreover, even if this evidence had some relevance 
to show something other than that Murray has a homicidal 
character, this relevance was so slight and the potential for 
unfair prejudice was so great that Fed. R. Evid. 403 demanded the 
exclusion of the evidence.   
 Rule 403 provides in pertinent part that "[a]lthough 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice       
. . . ."  We review a Rule 403 ruling for abuse of discretion 
unless the district court failed to explain its ruling and "its 
reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the record." 
 Himelwright, 42 F.3d at 781.   
 In this case, the district court's on-record 
explanation for its ruling was minimal.  It appears that the 
district court conducted virtually all of its Rule 403 discussion 
off the record in chambers and that the sum total of its on-
record treatment of the issue is the conclusory statement that 
(..continued) 
in self-defense "was in stark contrast to the . . . nature of 
Bacallo's wounds."   Id. at 9.  Thus, without any suggestion by 
the defense that the killing was accidental or occurred in self-
defense, it is questionable whether the New York killing was 
relevant, and in any event its probative value to show absence of 
accident or self-defense was undoubtedly negligible. 
  
 
 19 
"[t]he Court recognizes that it is prejudicial, but it is also 
highly probative."  (App. 377)  When the record does not contain 
an adequate explanation of a trial judge's Rule 403 ruling, a 
remand for clarification may be appropriate, but here we see no 
reason for a remand, because we see no basis on which the 
admission of the evidence in question could be sustained.  Cf. 
United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 744 n.8 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("We take this occasion, once again, to remind the district 
courts of their obligation to perform this weighing process on 
the record.  Although we are able to perform this balancing here, 
other cases may require remand to the court for such proceedings 
or even for a new trial.").   
  It should go without saying that evidence in a murder 
trial that the defendant committed another prior murder poses a 
high risk of unfair prejudice.  Stukes' testimony concerning the 
uncharged New York murder informed the jury that Murray had shot 
at point-blank range a man with whom he had no personal conflict 
and whom he appears not to have even known.  Evidence would have 
to possess significant probative value to avoid being 
substantially outweighed by the grave danger of unfair prejudice 
that this testimony carried.   
 In the previous section of this opinion, we reviewed 
all of the government's arguments as to how the evidence of the 
New York murder was relevant to prove something other than 
Murray's homicidal character, and we concluded that this evidence 
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was not even relevant to show any of the permissible things 
mentioned by the government or the district court at trial.  But 
even if the evidence of the New York murder had some relevance 
under one or more of these theories, its legitimate probative 
value was unquestionably slight.   We will now again discuss all 
of the government's theories, but we will add a few comments 
about the government's best theory, i.e., that the proof of the 
New York murder was relevant to show Murray's role in the CCE.   
 As we previously noted, the government's theory 
apparently is that the evidence of the New York murder was 
relevant to show that Murray played the role of the CCE's killer, 
that the Bacallo murder was committed to serve the CCE's 
interests, and that therefore it could be inferred that Murray 
committed that murder.  Even if there were some slight evidence 
that the New York murder was connected with the CCE charged in 
the indictment, the probative value of the testimony regarding 
the New York murder to show that Murray committed the Bacallo 
murder would still be small.  Under the government's theory, the 
probative value of the evidence of the New York murder depends on 
the uniqueness of Murray's role as the CCE's "shooter."  The 
events surrounding the New York murder, however, as recounted by 
Stukes, do not show that Murray played the unique and distinctive 
role of the CCE's killer.  On the contrary,  Stukes testified 
that Bradley "has a rep in New York as being a shooter," 
explained that Bradley brought him along to see how Bradley 
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established that reputation, and testified that Bradley "sprayed 
the building" with gunfire.  (App. 458, 460) Accordingly, the 
testimony regarding the New York murder suggested at most that 
Murray was a shooter, not the shooter.  Unless there were 
significant evidence linking the New York murder to the CCE, 
Stukes' account of the New York murder would appear to have 
little legitimate probative value.6  Accordingly, we hold that 
the district court abused its discretion in concluding that any 
legitimate probative value possessed by this evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 We are unable to conclude that the district court’s 
Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 errors were harmless in relation to the 
murder charge.  In order to do so, we would have to be persuaded 
that it is "highly probable that the evidence . . . did not 
contribute to the jury’s judgment of conviction."  Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. Schwartz, 790 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir. 
1986)).  While the jury might have convicted Murray of the murder 
without relying on Stukes’ testimony, we do not believe that the 
other evidence against him was so overwhelming as to render that 
conclusion "highly probable."  There was only one eyewitness, and 
                     
6.  On redirect examination, Stukes was asked, "What was Mr. 
Murray’s role or function or reputation in your crew?" and Stukes 
responded that he was "[j]ust a shooter." (App. 522-23) The 
parties have not addressed the question whether this testimony, 
as opposed to Stukes' testimony concerning the New York murder, 
was properly admitted, and we therefore do not reach that 
question here.    
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the jury might well have discounted or discredited his testimony 
based on his delay in reporting what he knew and his extensive 
history of drug use.  Furthermore, as explained below, his 
credibility was improperly bolstered with testimony that was 
proscribed by Fed. R. Evid. 608.  Many of the government’s other 
witnesses were similarly impeached on the basis of 
inconsistencies in their stories, their interest in cooperating 
with the prosecution, and their own drug use.  Moreover, in its 
closing argument, the government emphasized Stukes’ testimony.  
The prosecutor said:  
[Stukes] was present in July of 1991 when this defendant gunned 
down an individual in New York, participated in a 
murder with Jonathan Ray Bradley of a drug dealer over 
drugs.  Doesn’t that help establish that this defendant 
was part of this conspiracy whose role as Stukes said 
was the shooter, whose favorite weapon was a .45? 
 
This is not the trial of that incident in New York.  This is not 
that trial.  That evidence is offered to establish the 
reliability of all of the other information 
establishing this defendant as the killer of Juan 
Carlos Bacallao [sic] in this case.  And if you credit 
that testimony of Stukes, doesn’t that help establish 
that this defendant is in fact a killer, the shooter, 
the executioner of Juan Carlos Bacallao [sic]? 
 
App. 915-16 (emphasis added).   
 We cannot disregard the possibility that the evidence 
of the New York murder "weigh[ed] too much with the jury and . . 
. so overpersuade[d] them as to prejudice one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge."  United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 
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476-76 (1948)).  We are thus constrained to reverse the judgment 
of conviction as to the murder charge contained in count two and 
to remand for a new trial on that charge to be conducted without 
evidence of the New York murder.  In contrast, we believe that 
the erroneous admission of Stukes' testimony was harmless with 
respect to the drug charges contained in counts three and six of 
the superseding indictment.  Murray's argument on appeal focuses 
exclusively on the murder conviction, and it is with respect to 
that charge that the jury could have been improperly influenced 
by Stukes' testimony; while evidence that Murray was a murderer 
might have contributed to his conviction for murder, such 
evidence is unlikely to have persuaded the jury that Murray was 
guilty of the drug charges.  Moreover, the government presented 
substantially stronger evidence in support of the drug charges 
than in support of the murder charge, including testimony by many 
individuals who participated in the CCE or who were associated 
with participants as well as by a Harrisburg police officer who 
had made an undercover purchase of cocaine from Murray.  We 
therefore conclude that it is "highly probable," Archibald, 987 
F.2d at 187, that Stukes' testimony did not contribute to the 
jury's conviction of Murray on the drug charges.        
 
 III. 
 Murray argues that the admission of the testimony of 
Lt. John Goshert of the Harrisburg police department contravened 
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Fed. R. Evid. 608.  Murray timely and clearly objected to Lt. 
Goshert’s testimony.  (App. 826-28) In relevant part, Rule 608 
provides: 
(a) The credibility of a witness may be . . . supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but 
subject to these limitations . . . (2) evidence of 
truthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or 
otherwise. 
 
(b) Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ 
credibility . . . may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence.   
 
 Murray’s first argument is that Brown’s character for 
truthfulness was not "attacked by opinion or reputation evidence 
or otherwise."  We disagree.  It is true that Murray did not 
present any opinion or reputation evidence to impeach Brown, but 
Murray’s counsel performed an extended and vigorous cross-
examination of Brown that exposed Brown’s various illegal and 
sordid activities.  Murray’s counsel questioned Brown about his 
long-standing and heavy drug use, his acquaintance with many 
Harrisburg drug dealers, his apparent under-the-table tax-free 
compensation for his work as an informant, his convictions for 
drug possession and theft of services, his unlawful carrying of 
an unlicensed firearm, his concealment of his drug use from his 
friend and contact in the Harrisburg police department, and his 
prior inconsistent statements to the grand jury.  (App. 730-61)  
In view of this questioning, the opinion or reputation testimony 
given by Lt. Goshert fell within the language of Rule 608(a)(2) 
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permitting the introduction of such evidence to support a 
witness’ credibility when his character for truthfulness has been 
"otherwise" attacked.  See, e.g., United States v. Dring, 930 
F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 836 (1992); 
Fed. R. Evid. 608(a), Advisory Committee Notes ("evidence of 
misconduct, including conviction of crime," permits 
rehabilitation). 
 Murray’s more persuasive argument is founded upon Rule 
608(b)’s prohibition on proving specific instances of a witness’ 
conduct by extrinsic evidence.  Once Brown’s character for 
truthfulness was attacked by Murray’s counsel, the government was 
entitled to attempt to rehabilitate Brown by calling a witness to 
give opinion or reputation testimony as to Brown’s character for 
truthfulness.  But the government was not entitled to present 
"extrinsic evidence" of "specific instances" of Brown’s conduct 
"for the purpose of . . . supporting [his] credibility."  Fed. R. 
Evid. 608(b).  Lt. Goshert’s testimony was as follows: 
Q. Lieutenant Goshert, do you know an individual by the name of 
Richard Brown? 
 
 A. Yes, I do. 
 
Q. Have you ever used Mr. Brown as a confidential informant? 
 
A. On numerous occasions, the Harrisburg Police has utilized him. 
 
Q. As a result pf [sic] your using Richard Brown as a 
confidential informant, have you made any cases? 
 
 A. Yes, we have. 
 
 Q. Do you have an idea of approximately how many? 
 
 A. In excess of 65.  65, 66 something like that. 
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Q. And search warrants, have you obtained search warrants based 
on his information? 
 
 A. Yes, we have numerous times. 
 
Q. How long a period of time have you been dealing with Mr. 
Brown? 
 
 A. Since 1988. 
 
Q. Based on your dealings with Mr. Brown and the cases you said 
that he has made, can you give us your opinion as to 
his reputation for being a reliable individual? 
 
 A. He is extremely reliable. 
 
 Q. In terms of the accuracy of the information? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
App. 835-36. 
 
 This testimony, in our view, included  "extrinsic 
evidence" of Brown’s character for truthfulness.  United States 
v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 1989)("Extrinsic evidence 
is evidence offered through other witnesses rather than through 
cross-examination of the witness himself or herself."), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1087 (1990).  Murray argues that Lt. Goshert’s 
quantification of the cases that Brown had "made" constituted 
evidence of "specific instances" of Brown’s conduct and thus 
should have been excluded under Rule 608(b).  The government 
contends that Lt. Goshert’s testimony was proper as foundation 
for his opinion as to Brown’s character for truthfulness.   In 
support of the admission of Lt. Goshert’s testimony in the 
district court, the government argued that "[t]here has got to be 
some basis for the jury to know how he can give that opinion as 
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to his reputation.  And by letting the jury know they have a 
close working relationship over a period of time and that they 
have been involved in all of these incidents, then there is a 
basis for him giving that opinion."  (App. 828) We agree that Lt. 
Goshert’s testimony that the Harrisburg police had used Brown as 
a confidential informant on "numerous occasions" since 1988 was 
necessary to establish that he had a basis on which to offer his 
opinion as to Brown’s character for truthfulness.  However, his 
testimony that Brown had "made" 65 or 66 cases was more specific 
than can be justified as necessary to establish a foundation.7  
 United States v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1990) 
presented a situation extremely similar to the instant case.  In 
Taylor as in this case, the government’s fortunes depended in 
large part on the credibility of an informant, and the government 
called a law enforcement officer to testify as to the informant’s 
reliability.  The officer testified that the informant "had acted 
as a buyer for the government on 15 to 18 drug buys," that he 
"had given reliable information in a particular case which 
resulted in the seller’s conviction," and that "several others 
either pleaded guilty or were convicted as a result of [the 
informant’s] testimony."  Id. at 780-81.  The court held that it 
was error to admit evidence that the informant’s testimony had 
                     
7.7  The government prepared a chart detailing the particular 
instances where Brown had provided information to the Harrisburg 
police, but it conceded that the chart was not admissible under 
Rule 608(b).  (App. 827) 
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resulted in convictions in other cases.  Id. at 781.  Lt. 
Goshert’s testimony was substantially identical, and we conclude 
that its admission contravened Rule 608(b). 
 We are buttressed in this conclusion by the emphasis 
placed by the government on Lt. Goshert’s testimony in its 
closing argument.  The government first told the jury that "[i]t 
was very important, wasn’t it, to hear from him?" and then 
argued: 
And Lieutenant Goshert, you think he would let any of his men or 
himself kick down some door with a search warrant on a 
drug raid or make an arrest on information from 
somebody that they didn’t think was reliable?  Sixty-
seven cases, Richard Brown has proven to be a reliable 
source of information for.  They stake their lives on 
his testimony -- on his information.  Does that give 
you some sense of how reliable he is? 
 
App. 913-14.  This emphasis compounded the significance of the 
error in allowing Lt. Goshert’s specific-instance testimony and 
prevents us from concluding that the error was harmless.8  On 
retrial, the district court should limit the government to 
                     
8.  8In United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 760-61 & n.9 (1st 
Cir. 1989), the court held that it was error to allow "a 
professional government witness [to] vouch[] for the credibility 
of an informant," but found that the district court rendered the 
error harmless by instructing the jury that: "Members of the 
jury, you have to make a determination whether you believe Mr. 
Pacheco [the informant].  Whether Mr. Costa believes him or not 
is not relevant to that, you have to make that determination, 
based on your own observations of Mr. Pacheco and only that, and 
your judgment as to whether he was telling the truth."  No such 
curative instruction was given in this case. 
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eliciting from Lt. Goshert only such testimony as is necessary to 
establish a foundation for his opinion.9 
   
 IV. 
 Murray also argues that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to disqualify for cause a juror who had read a 
newspaper article about the case.  Immediately before trial 
commenced on August 10, 1995, the court asked whether any jurors 
had seen an article that appeared in the Harrisburg Patriot-News 
 on August 2, 1995, entitled "Feds won’t seek death penalty for 
accused killer, 22."  (App. 85) The article stated, inter alia, 
that Murray had previously pled guilty to the murder and had 
described it as "not a premeditation or contract killing.  It was 
just a stupid unfortunate incident."  (App. 85)  
 A juror named Mary Kling acknowledged that she had read 
the article and was subjected to voir dire by the court and by 
Murray’s counsel.  (App. 413-15) Kling stated that all she could 
remember from the article was that the government had decided not 
to seek the death penalty and had not given any explanation for 
that decision, that Murray was accused of murder, and that he was 
                     
9.  Murray does not argue that the erroneous admission of Lt. 
Goshert’s testimony somehow taints his convictions on the drug 
charges.  The prejudicial effect of Lt. Goshert’s testimony was 
to bolster the credibility of Richard Brown, who testified about 
the murder of which Murray was convicted.  However, Brown did not 
testify in support of the drug charges.  We therefore conclude 
that the district court’s Rule 608(b) error does not require 
reversal of Murray’s drug convictions. 
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from New York.  (App. 414) She denied that she had formed any 
opinion as to Murray’s guilt or innocence and affirmed that she 
could decide the case on the basis of the evidence.  (App. 413-
14) The court was satisfied that Kling could serve impartially 
and denied Murray’s motion to excuse her for cause.  (App. 419)  
 "In determining whether a particular juror should be 
excused for cause, our main concern is whether the juror holds a 
particular belief or opinion that will prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath."  Kirk v. Raymark Indus., 
Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1015 (1996).  "Determining whether a 
prospective juror can render a fair verdict lies peculiarly 
within a trial judge's province."  United States v. Polan, 970 
F.2d 1280, 1284 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 953 (1993) 
(quotation omitted).  We review the district court’s ruling only 
for an abuse of discretion; "the question of the partiality of an 
individual juror `is plainly one of historical fact:  did a juror 
swear that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and 
decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror's 
protestation of impartiality have been believed . . . . 
[Therefore,] the trial court's resolution of such questions is 
entitled, even on direct appeal, to special deference.'"  United 
States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 994 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
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476 U.S. 1172 (1986) (quoting Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 
2891 (1984)).   
 Under this deferential standard of review, we are 
unable to conclude that the court erred in allowing Kling to 
serve as a juror.  
 
 V. 
 Murray’s final argument is that the district court 
erred in allowing Sean Proffit to testify as to what Murray told 
him in jail.  Murray argues that the admission of Proffit’s 
testimony deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  Massiah 
held that the government may not, consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment, use as evidence statements made by the defendant 
"which [it] had deliberately elicited from him after he had been 
indicted and in the absence of his counsel."  Id. at 206.  See 
also United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 421-22 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Thus, if the government had deliberately placed Proffit in 
proximity with Murray with the intention of eliciting 
incriminating statements from Murray in the absence of his 
counsel, Murray’s claim would be valid.  See United States v. 
Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980).  In this case, however, the 
district court held an evidentiary hearing following Murray’s 
objection to Proffit’s testimony and concluded that there was no 
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evidence that the government did so.  (App. 396-412) We perceive 
no error in the district court’s treatment of this issue.   
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of 
conviction and sentence on the murder charge and remand for a new 
trial.  We affirm the judgment of conviction as to the drug 
charges and remand for resentencing, if appropriate, on those 
counts. 
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